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The case of Carnival Cruise Lines chronicles the com-
pany’s birth and development as it redefined the
leisure cruise industry. With a theme of “Fun Ships”
and low pricing, Carnival appealed to a diverse mar-
ket. Under the pressure of increasing competition,
Carnival was challenged to refine its Fun Ships brand
without damaging the considerable equity contained
in that brand. In particular, as cruise lines became
less differentiated in the customers’ view, Carnival
sought to set itself apart with upgraded product fea-
tures, service, and other guest amenities, as well as
a more sophisticated brand message.
Keywords: branding; brand equity; marketing strategy;
cruise industry; Carnival Cruise Lines
We’re perfectly happy to be the Wal-Mart of the cruise
industry.
—Terry Thornton, vice president of marketing planning,
Carnival Cruise Lines1
In July 2005, the 2,974-passenger, 110,000-tonCarnival Liberty set sail after being christened by its“godmother,” actress Mira Sorvino.2 Built for $500
million, the ship was the twenty-first vessel sailing in
Carnival Cruise Lines’ fleet, giving Carnival more pas-
senger-carrying capacity than any other cruise line in the
world. With 800-plus ocean-view or balcony staterooms,
twenty-two lounges and bars, four swimming pools, and
a spiral waterslide, Carnival Liberty was a far cry from
the Mardi Gras, Carnival’s first ship, which was a con-
verted transatlantic liner bought in 1972 for $6.5 million.
For its part, the Mardi Gras seemed to signal an inauspi-
cious beginning for Carnival when the ship ran aground
at the tip of Miami Beach on its inaugural voyage—in
full view of gawking vacationers. However, as Carnival
lore had it, bartenders poured free drinks (including a
new rum cocktail that a creative bartender dubbed a
“Mardi Gras on the Rocks”), passengers had fun, and
the spirit of the “Fun Ships” brand was born.3
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The differences between the Mardi
Gras and the Carnival Liberty symbolized
the metamorphosis of the Carnival brand.
Today’s Carnival was dramatically differ-
ent from the company that cruise industry
pioneer Ted Arison started with second-
hand ships and savvy marketing. While
North American passenger volume dou-
bled between 1994 and 2004, Carnival’s
volume tripled. More than three million
guests sailed Carnival in 2004, the most
in the company’s history, and a figure rep-
resenting nearly one out of every three
cruisers. For the fiscal year that included
2004, Carnival Corporation and PLC, the
parent company of Carnival Cruise Lines,
reported record net income of $1.85 bil-
lion on revenues of $9.73 billion. Nine of
Carnival’s ships, almost half of the line’s
available berths, had been launched since
2000.4 Through the years, Carnival had
remained true to its “Fun Ships” brand lin-
eage and its goal of providing a good-
quality, affordable vacation to mainstream
travelers. Nevertheless, company execu-
tives wondered whether it was time to set
a new course for Carnival and, if so, how
best to burnish the brand without losing
its essence.
This case study examines challenges
associated with brand management in the
hospitality industry by focusing on the
leisure cruise sector and the brand that
dominates the seascape. Despite Carnival
Cruise Lines’ phenomenal growth and
success, company executives have designed
a makeover for the brand to enhance brand
equity—the worth of the brand due to cus-
tomers’ brand knowledge and the effect of
this knowledge on brand marketing and
customers’ assessment of brand value.5
Modifying a successful brand, even if the
changes are evolutionary, not revolution-
ary, carries the risk of brand confusion, as
most any cue can communicate meaning
about a brand. Nurturing an established
brand demands not only a deep under-
standing of customers’ needs and wants
but also a clear vision about the brand’s
core meaning and the alignment of myriad
cues (e.g., product features and marketing
message) to support this meaning. To
begin the analysis of Carnival’s brand-
management situation, I explore Carnival
Cruise Lines’ position within the competi-
tive structure of the cruise industry. I then
describe Carnival’s marketing strategy and
the evolution of the Carnival brand.
Finally, I evaluate Carnival’s brand initia-
tives and discuss implications of manage-
ment’s efforts to burnish the brand.
The Cruise Industry and
Competitive Structure
The birth of the modern cruise industry
can be traced to the 1960s, in the wake of
the first Boeing 707 flight from New York
to Europe in 1958.6 With a rapidly shrink-
ing transatlantic passenger base, oppor-
tunistic shipping companies repositioned
their service from transportation to vaca-
tion travel. Companies that did not “come
about” to cruising soon foundered. At the
same time, lines that led the transition,
such as Princess Cruises (1965), Norwegian
Caribbean Line (1966; now Norwegian
Cruise Line [NCL]), Royal Caribbean Cruise
Line (1969; now Royal Caribbean Inter-
national [RCI]), and Carnival Cruise Lines
(1972), paced the industry. Still, the pas-
senger base was relatively small. In 1970,
only 500,000 people took a cruise.7 A
cruise was an expensive, formal, and rela-
tively lengthy vacation—seven to fourteen
days on average—factors that contributed
to the product’s snobby image and limited
appeal. That began to change with the
1977 launch of The Love Boat TV series,
when cruising in all its romanticized glory
was popularized to mainstream America.
Since then, the industry had grown tenfold
to more than nine million passengers in
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2004—an annual growth rate of 8.2 per-
cent, making it the fastest-growing form of
leisure travel.8
The cruise industry was still young and
evolving. Whereas luxury brands once
held sway (at least in the public’s percep-
tion), less than 5 percent of current cruise
capacity served this market (see Exhibit 1).9
With the exception of Cunard’s behemoth
Queen Mary 2, luxury lines tended to use
smaller ships that carried only a few hundred
guests and featured exotic itineraries,
gourmet dining, a relatively formal atmos-
phere, and attentive personal service. Not
surprisingly, this attracted a refined, afflu-
ent clientele that was comfortable with
paying $400 to $900 per person per day.
An even smaller segment of the industry
was served by destination or specialty cruise
lines that sailed, for example, masted sail-
ing vessels or replica paddle-wheeler ships
for river cruises. Roughly one-third of the
Exhibit 1:
North American Cruise Lines and Brand Positioning
Double Market 
Ships Occupancy Market Share Positioning
Carnival Corporation
Carnival Cruise Lines 21 47,908 24.2% Contemporary
Princess 13 28,820 14.5% Premium
Holland America Line 12 16,978 8.6% Premium
Costa Cruises (U.S. market) 2 4,224 2.1% Contemporary
Cunard Line (U.S.) 2 4,411 2.2% Luxury
Windstar Cruises 3 604 0.3% Destination
Yachts of Seabourn 3 624 0.3% Luxury
Total 56 103,569 52.2%
Royal Caribbean International
Royal Caribbean 19 44,108 22.3% Contemporary
International
Celebrity Cruises 9 16,118 8.1% Premium
Total 28 60,226 30.4%
Star Cruises
Norwegian Cruise Line 9 16,734 8.4% Contemporary
Orient Lines 1 826 0.4% Destination
Total 10 17,560 8.9%
Other CLIA-affiliated brands
Crystal Cruises 3 2,960 1.5% Luxury
Disney Cruise Line 2 3,508 1.8% Contemporary
MSC Cruises 3 4,410 2.2% Contemporary
Oceania Cruises 3 2,052 1.0% Premium
Radisson Seven Seas 5 2,604 1.3% Luxury
Cruises
Silversea Cruises 4 1,356 0.7% Luxury
Total 20 16,890 8.5%
Grand Total 114 198,245
Source: Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA), 2005 Cruise Manual (New York: CLIA, 2005).
Note: CLIA-member cruise lines comprise approximately 95% of the cruise capacity marketed from North America.
market, often veteran cruisers, sailed the
premium cruise lines. These companies
offered high-quality service on relatively
large ships that typically accommodated
2,000 or fewer guests paying $250 to $450
per person per day. Premium-level cruises
featured fine dining, a sophisticated atmos-
phere (though less formal than most luxury
cruises), spa facilities, abundant entertain-
ment, and a wide mix of destinations.
Cruising was dominated by brands that
served the “contemporary” segment, a
clever label used by cruise marketers to
describe the mass market. These cruise lines
featured ever-larger ships that accommo-
dated 2,000 to 3,400 guests who paid fares
ranging from $150 to $300 per person per
day. Although not heavy on personalized
service, these floating resorts offered an
abundance of good and varied food, plenty
of activities to satisfy travelers’ diverse
interests (including shopping, gaming,
sports, shows, parties, dancing, and movies),
and itineraries that visited popular vacation
destinations. Competition for the contem-
porary customer was fierce, particularly
between Carnival and RCI. Carnival exec-
utives argued, however, that the real com-
petition came from outside the cruise
industry in the form of land-based resorts
and hotels in sightseeing destinations such
as Las Vegas and Orlando.
The competitive structure in the cruise
industry changed dramatically around the
turn of the twenty-first century. Price wars
and soft demand decimated the budget
sector, with brands such as Regal, Premier,
and Commodore—“bottom feeders” with
older ships—unable to compete with the
bigger brands’ new ships and attractive
prices. Carnival Corp. won a battle with
RCI to gain ownership of Princess Cruises
in 2003; just five years earlier, Carnival
Corp. acquired Cunard Line in a move that
sent shockwaves through the industry for
its symbolic significance as the venerable,
upscale, 150-year-old British line was
scooped up by the American company
powered by the Fun Ships. Whereas the
cruise market in the 1970s and 1980s was
served by thirty brands, by 2005, only ten
brands owned by three corporations con-
trolled 90 percent of the market. Carnival
Corp. emerged as the largest cruise com-
pany in the world, with at least one brand
positioned in each of the four main seg-
ments. Significantly, Carnival Corp.’s flag-
ship brand had developed a formidable
cost-leadership competitive strategy that
enabled Carnival to deliver a good-value
vacation that attracted price-sensitive
cruisers and still produced profit margins
in excess of an astonishing 25 percent.
Although Carnival’s executives dismissed
competitive threats from rival RCI, the
two companies had waged a marketing
war for years. (In the past, when Carnival
and RCI ships would pass each other,
RCI’s cruise directors would launch a
broadside: “There goes the Kmart of the
Caribbean.”10) One battleground involved
an expensive game of one-upmanship with
industry “hardware,” the ships themselves.
The hardware competition became hot
starting in 1988, when RCI launched
the first purpose-built cruise “megaship,”
Sovereign of the Seas, which carried 2,250
passengers.11 Carnival answered in 1990
with the brand’s own megaship, the Fantasy,
the first of eight sister ships, each carrying
2,052 guests and noted for their six-deck-
high, neon-trimmed grand atriums and spiral
waterslides on the pool deck—both signa-
ture Carnival elements. Carnival launched
the next volley in 1996 with Carnival
Destiny, the first 100,000-ton cruise ship,
which carried 2,642 guests (though it
often sailed with 3,000) and featured one
of the largest casinos and spa and fitness
centers at sea.
In 1999, though, RCI trumped the field by
launching the 137,000-ton, 3,114-passenger
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Voyager of the Seas, the first of five ships
in the Voyager class. Voyager of the Seas
featured amenities such as an ice-skating
rink, inline-skating track, a basketball
court, a mini golf course, and a rock-
climbing wall that traversed the back of
the ship’s huge funnel. The latter feature
became a signature element for RCI, one
that cruisers and travel agents associated
with the brand and that was later added to
all the ships in its fleet. RCI also leveraged
the design attributes of the new ships in
the award-winning “Get Out There” pro-
motions campaign launched in 2000.
Featuring the tribal beats of the Iggy Pop
song “Lust for Life,” fast-paced commer-
cials showed passengers climbing, run-
ning, skating, and kayaking—but hardly
cruising. The campaign was intended to
reposition the brand by targeting vacation-
ers who had an “explorer” mind-set and
by focusing on active and adventurous
dimensions of the experience.12 In June
2006, RCI planned to up the stakes again
by launching the 158,000-ton, 3,600-
passenger Freedom of the Seas, featuring
an “aqua environment” on the top deck of
the ship with a sports pool, a family water
playground (with fountains, water can-
nons, a lazy river, and a waterfall), a wave
pool for surfing, and an adults-only swim-
ming area with hot tubs suspended more
than 100 feet above the sea.13
Competition among cruise brands
involved far more than building bigger
ships. Brands jockeyed for position in the
consumer’s (and travel agent’s) perceptual
space. For example, Carnival continued to
emphasize its Fun Ships positioning strat-
egy, while RCI attempted to position as a
more sophisticated product. A former RCI
executive drew the analogy that the brand
was in the “wine and cheese” category,
whereas Carnival was in the “beer and
pretzels” category.14 RCI’s ship décor and
overall atmosphere was described as more
tasteful than Carnival’s glitzy environment.
Critics noted, though, that with the Voyager
ships (“rather like a mall with a ship built
around it”), RCI’s and Carnival’s onboard
products had become similar.15
Cruise brands also stepped up the com-
petition with new products and services.
For example, Princess Cruises’ Caribbean
Princess sailed in April 2004 with a “Movies
under the Stars” program—the industry’s
first outdoor theater, with a poolside, 300-
square-foot screen. (A Princess executive
suggested, “This is our rock-climbing
wall.”16) Just one year later, Carnival
answered with “Carnival’s Seaside Theatre”
on the Carnival Liberty.17 NCL broke
from the conventional big-ship dining
model in 2000 by introducing the “revolu-
tionary” Freestyle Cruising concept,
which featured open seating in its ships’
dining rooms.18 Instead of the traditional
requirement that guests choose a dining
time, Freestyle Cruising emulated land-
based resorts by permitting guests to dine
when and with whom they wanted. One
year later, Carnival answered with Total
Choice Dining, which retained traditional
fixed-seating dining in the formal restau-
rants but offered a choice of four rather
than two dining times. This program was
complemented by an array of alternative
dining venues, such as specialty supper
clubs that required a reservation and fee,
sushi bars, and twenty-four-hour pizzerias.19
Carnival executives believed that changes
in the cruise product and cruise markets
had blurred the distinction between brands
competing in the contemporary and pre-
mium market segments. As companies like
Carnival and RCI continued to innovate and
to improve both product and service, and as
premium lines like Princess and Celebrity
increasingly pursued the upper end of the
mass market by offering more casual vaca-
tion experiences, the markets were converg-
ing, as were customers’ brand perceptions.
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Carnival’s Marketing Strategy
Carnival Cruise Lines’ early marketing
strategy grew out of necessity. The age of
the Mardi Gras made low fares necessary.
At that time, Carnival did not have a
national advertising campaign—in fact, no
cruise line did. While the onboard product
was limited during the lean startup years,
so were customers’ expectations, because
the cruise product was still relatively new.
Bob Dickinson illustrated,
Years ago, the ship’s gym was small
and hidden in the bowels of the ship
below the water line. You could barely
find it. But nobody cared back then.
If you did a vegetarian selection
thirty years ago, nobody would have
touched it. They wanted meat and
potatoes. Everything today is much
more elaborate—the fitness centers,
the menus, the activities. If people
want it, we’ll give it to them.
When Dickinson came on board as
Carnival’s vice president of sales and mar-
keting in 1973, he set in motion the Fun
Ships concept that would serve as the
brand’s cornerstone. Dickinson adopted the
Fun Ships moniker for Carnival after seeing
a brochure for the Boheme, which Com-
modore Cruise Lines promoted as the
“Happy Ship.” Cruise marketing at the time
tended to focus on destinations, rather than
the ships themselves, and promoted cruis-
ing as a highbrow, luxurious experience.
Dickinson reasoned that fun was what
people really sought in a vacation. By pro-
moting the Mardi Gras as a fun-ship expe-
rience, Carnival would send a message that
was unique in the cruise industry.20 Perhaps
more important, by anchoring the brand
with the Fun Ships positioning strategy,
Carnival built an unmatched value proposi-
tion on the promise of fun—a promise that
would direct the company’s marketing
strategy for at least the next thirty years.
In contrast to the typical cruise cus-
tomer, the Fun Ships theme attracted a
relatively young, middle-class clientele.
Carnival offered an entertainment experi-
ence, with the industry’s first full casinos,
live music, discos, and wild daytime
activities—including belly-flop, beer-chug-
ging, and hairy-chest contests—that were
a complete change from the image of
cruising as shuffleboard and afternoon
tea. Carnival’s hardware, in particular the
new ships built in the 1980s, were visual
bonanzas, with bright colors and neon
lighting unlike anything before seen in
a cruise ship (shocking to some ship
traditionalists).
Carnival pursued first-time cruisers as
part of a concerted market-development
strategy. To communicate the brand message
and demystify cruising for the uninitiated,
Carnival crafted marketing communica-
tions that articulated the Fun Ships image
by showing the ships and their entertain-
ment architecture, as well as by featuring
guests dining, dancing, playing, swim-
ming, sunning, and socializing—having
fun—at an affordable price. At the heart of
the message was new company spokes-
person Kathie Lee Gifford singing, “In the
morning, in the evening, Carnival’s got the
fun . . .” Carnival’s commercials starring
Gifford in 1984 were the first time a cruise
line advertised on network television. The
Carnival-Gifford relationship continued
well into the mid-1990s before giving way
to ad campaigns that featured the Beach
Boys’ tune “Fun, Fun, Fun” and the Cyndi
Lauper hit “Girls Just Want to Have Fun.”
The marketing objective remained the
same, however: to introduce vacationers to
cruising and to reinforce the image of
Carnival as the essence of fun.
“Today’s Carnival,” a label that company
executives used to underscore changes in
the brand, was different in form, but not
necessarily direction, from the Carnival of
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the past. Carnival’s pricing continued to
lead the industry, with an average price point
per person per day of about $175, com-
pared with an industry average of $235.21
The ships and onboard product were
improved.22 Driving this change, accord-
ing to Bob Dickinson, was Carnival’s vision:
“to consistently provide quality cruise vaca-
tions that exceed the expectations of our
guests.” However, the marketing depart-
ment was still charged with not over-
promising. Instead, Carnival’s marketing
communications would create reasonable
guest expectations—just high enough for
customers to buy; the product was then
designed to deliver more.
Dickinson estimated that only 16 percent
of North Americans had ever taken a cruise,
leaving a substantial untapped market of
prospective customers. As such, Carnival
continued to direct its marketing efforts at
stimulating primary demand for cruising
by converting land vacationers to sea vaca-
tioners. Carnival estimated that half of its
guests were first-time cruisers, and one-
third of repeat cruisers had never sailed
Carnival before. Dickinson saw this seg-
ment of repeaters as the low-hanging fruit.
Because these customers understood
cruising and loved the experience, it was
only necessary to talk to them about the
brand. The challenge, though, was reach-
ing these customers with the right mes-
sage. Terry Thornton, vice president of
marketing planning, explained,
We don’t touch the customer or control
the selling experience directly in most
sales transactions—80-percent-plus
come through travel agents. We still
suffer from the perceptions of when
our hardware was not so good and
when our product had inconsistencies.
Sometimes travel agents don’t sell
with enough frequency to really know
the difference, or haven’t been aboard
one of our ships in years, even though
we offer many opportunities for them
to sample the product. Our challenge
really is to get a little more credit for
the product we’re providing.
Carnival had a large field-sales force
who called on travel agents, as well as a
growing direct-sales effort that included
an inbound channel (Carnival.com and
1-800-Carnival) and outbound channel of
Personal Vacation Planners (PVPs) who
followed up on leads obtained through the
inbound channel. PVPs called or e-mailed
leads to promote cruise sailings that
Carnival’s revenue managers identified as
having soft demand. However, some
people at Carnival worried that these “one
day only” sales sent the wrong message.
Noted one manager,
We are struggling with how we want
to present the brand. This is a lovely
vacation, and even though it’s an
entry-level product for the cruise
industry, it is still expensive relative
to most vacation products, so we
don’t want customers to perceive our
direct marketing as this used-car
sales approach. We have been travel
agent focused for so long. The direct
access is so new to us.
Carnival was careful not to be too
aggressive in its direct-sales efforts, espe-
cially in marketing to past guests who
originally booked through agents. Still, the
relationship between Carnival and travel
agents had turbulent moments. Some
agents, in particular the midsized Internet
agencies, began to rebate part of their
commission to customers to gain a price
advantage in the market—a practice that
led to channel conflict. Carnival responded
with an advertised-price policy, which meant
agents could no longer promote a price
lower than Carnival’s advertised price.
Brenda Yester, vice president of revenue
management, commented, “It just became
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dysfunctional and was degrading the
brand. There has to be price integrity in
the market. Consumers need to shop for a
Carnival cruise and not worry about where
they’re buying it.” Bob Dickinson added,
“Many travel agents are just order takers;
they are driven by price.”
Carnival’s target market was broad—
consumers twenty-five to fifty-four years
old who made $40,000 or more per year.
The average age of Carnival’s customer
was forty-six—only a few years younger
than the industry average.23 Carnival’s
marketers believed that the product was
popular with families, honeymooners,
singles, and seniors—“everyman.” Bob
Dickinson argued that demographic seg-
mentation was irrelevant for Carnival
because there was no prototypical Carnival
customer, except that person who cruised
to have fun: “If you have a vacation desti-
nation that has a wide bandwidth of
choice, you’re casting a bigger net, and
you’re going to get more fish.”
Carnival Cruise Lines’
Brand Evolution
Maurice Zarmati, vice president of
sales and one of the original employees of
Carnival Cruise Lines, had seen the brand
evolve considerably:
We started Carnival with one old ship.
We’ve upgraded the product tremen-
dously over the years. For example, we
serve lobsters on all the ships at least
once during a cruise. We put in alter-
native bistro dining, supper clubs, and
complementary twenty-four-hour cabin
service. Guests can buy premium wine
by the glass. Recently, we put duvets in
the cabins, which would have been
unheard of ten years ago. The quality
of food and service, in our estimation, is
far better than our competitors. Of
course, fifteen years ago, our product
was not at the standard that it is today.
Carnival executives pointed to inconsis-
tent product quality as one of the blem-
ishes on the brand in the past. Initially,
it was secondhand ships, but even with
new ships, service delivery and food qual-
ity were variable. It was not until the
mid-1990s that Carnival began to focus on
people and processes. The “Carnival
College” in-house training program was
started to offer crew the opportunity to
enhance language and other skills. Hospi-
tality training was also introduced to
encourage crew to treat cruisers as “guests,”
not passengers. Terry Thornton provided
these examples:
We’ve tried to focus training on the
small things, like greeting guests. If
a guest passes a crew member, the
guest should be greeted. He should
hear, “Good morning, how are you,
how was your day at shore,” things
like that. When we first started this
training, we measured how many
greetings or similar recognition was
offered out of all possible interac-
tions, and it was less than 20 percent.
Today, it’s 65 to 70 percent.
Another simple service idea, imple-
mented fleetwide in 2002, involved placing
mirrors in the crew areas near the exit doors,
along with a sign to “Share a Smile.” The
idea was to remind crew to smile when
interacting with guests. Thornton noted,
“That’s what people want today—to feel
comfortable and to be recognized.”
In 2005, Carnival offered its first
customer-loyalty program in the form
of a guest-recognition card. When guests
embarked on a Carnival cruise, they received
a “Sail & Sign” card that was identifica-
tion for boarding the ship, a cabin key, and
a credit card for purchasing almost any-
thing onboard. The new program gave
repeat Carnival cruisers a gold Sail & Sign
card that would offer a way for crew
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members to recognize guests for their
patronage and to offer more personalized
attention. Bob Dickinson believed that
such recognition changed the dynamics of
the guest-crew interaction and provided
huge “psychic income”—an “emotional
stroke” for the guest at little cost. Terry
Thornton added,
The strategy is to push on the product,
to continually improve it, because
as people come back from their
cruises, word-of-mouth promotion is
getting stronger and stronger. People
really are enjoying the product. Their
satisfaction levels are high. They tell
their travel agents and tell their
friends.
Carnival executives believed that brand
perceptions lagged reality, despite their
efforts to persuade consumers and travel
agents that “Today’s Carnival” was differ-
ent than the “all-out party” Carnival of the
past. Lingering misperceptions were partly
a function of the underselling approach of
brand promotion. Vicki Freed, senior vice
president of sales and marketing, joined
the Carnival sales team in 1978:
We used to have travel agents com-
plain, “How come Carnival doesn’t
have shampoo in the bathrooms?”
This amenity would have been a
million-dollar upgrade.We would argue
that people come with their own
shampoo, but the agents would
say, “Go to any hotel and you’ll
find complementary shampoo!” Well,
they were right. The customer has
changed—there’s a trading up phe-
nomenon. Now we provide brand-
name amenities, and the consumer
wants brand names now.
Carnival began to investigate cobranding
opportunities for the onboard product, both
to enhance the guest experience and to
enhance Carnival’s brand image. Although
Carnival’s senior management knew that
the cruise line would remain a mass-
market product, there was a desire try to
refine the market—to “push the needle
up” to a more discerning consumer. Bob
Dickinson remarked,
Just as Las Vegas or Orlando have
redefined themselves, we’ve needed
to do so, too. In the early days, in
product delivery and in perception,
we were like Daytona Beach, Spring
Break at sea: a lot of kids, unchaper-
oned, anything goes, beer-drinking
contests, things like that. By the mid-
1990s, we reengineered all that. We
were the first company in the cruise
business to change the drinking age
from eighteen to twenty-one. We also
required anyone under the age of
twenty-one to share a cabin with
someone who was at least twenty-
five. Those two actions, coupled with
strengthening of our Camp Carnival
children’s program, created the same
average age of passenger on Carnival,
but the nineteen-year-old was replaced
with a seven-year-old and an early-
thirties set of parents. That was a
much deeper market.
By design, the Carnival experience was
casual and unintimidating rather than
upscale. Although the ships had sommeliers
who offered expensive wines, Carnival sold
far more beer, much of it poolside at $14 for
a bucket of four bottles. Although some
critics said that the ships were garish,
the décor was designed to be “different
than people would ever see at home.”
Maintaining consistency of the brand mes-
sage was considered vital to Carnival’s suc-
cess. Terry Thornton explained,
It’s often misunderstood why we are
who we are. And we battle ourselves
sometimes. We look at our competitors
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and it’s easy to be fooled into think-
ing we should be more like them. And
then we say, “That’s not who we are.
That’s not what got us here. That’s
not what our guests like.”
Bob Dickinson elaborated,
As we build our ships and as we deal
with our customers, we try very hard
not to send mixed messages. We try to
never use the word gourmet, though
we think our food is as good as or
better than anyone else in our mar-
ket, including companies on the pre-
mium end. Still, we’re trying not to
forget our roots.
Carnival sought to anticipate what
guests wanted in their cruise experience.
Even as some things remained constant—
the entertainment, casino gaming, dining
choices, nightclubs, and bars—Carnival
also adapted to trends, offering cigar bars,
karaoke, and even airbrush tattoos. In 2005,
Carnival introduced the Presidential Wine
Club and planned to host its first Wine
Club cruise later in the year (Dickinson is
a noted wine collector and connoisseur).
The search for new Fun Ships ideas was an
ongoing process. Still, there was the sense
within the industry that RCI had grabbed
Carnival’s wind by launching its adventure-
theme Voyager ships. Commented Brenda
Yester,
Royal Caribbean has had a great run
with the “Get Out There” campaign.
But it attracts a certain kind of person
who may not be attracted to Carnival.
The rock-climbing wall is their icon—
that’s their brand. Our icon is fun—
that’s our brand.
Carnival was not daunted, however, as
it continued to promote its augmented fun
image with the biggest media buy in the
company’s history. With the slogan “Million
Ways to Have Fun,” the 2005 campaign
was intended to build the brand by show-
casing product enhancements.24 New print
ads targeted such publications as Travel &
Leisure, Condé Nast Traveler, Vanity Fair,
People, and Oprah, marking Carnival’s
first large-scale push into consumer maga-
zines (see Exhibit 2).
Four television commercials, featuring
Bobby Darin’s recording of “Somewhere
Beyond the Sea,” coincided with the print
campaign, running on The West Wing, The
O.C., Law & Order, and The Amazing
Race, as well as on such cable channels as
VHI, A&E, the Travel Channel, and the
Food Network. The television commer-
cials were softer, subtler, slower paced,
and more sophisticated than past Carnival
ads. For example, one spot showed an
older couple having breakfast on the bal-
cony, playing golf on shore, enjoying a
massage in the spa, and dancing with wait-
ers in the dining room. In another spot, a
young couple jogged on the deck of a Fun
Ship, worked out in the fitness center, flew
on elevated cables during an adventurous
canopy tour, and sampled a glass of wine at
the bar. Another spot featured a family and
showed a child gliding down a Carnival
waterslide and a cabin steward placing a
“towel animal” on a bed. Each spot closed
with a male voice-over: “On a Carnival
cruise, at any one moment, there are a mil-
lion ways to have fun. Carnival. The Fun
Ships.” Vicki Freed explained the strategy
behind the new campaign as follows:
Our other commercials didn’t really
sell Carnival—they sold the category.
We’ve always taken the high road at
Carnival: We’ll sell the contemporary
category and get our fair share
because we’re the big brand. But now
we want to sell Today’s Carnival. And
that’s what the new commercials
hopefully convey—a little more upscale,
the food, the service. It’s important for
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Exhibit 2:
Carnival “Million Ways” Mosaic Print Ad—“Yoga”
us to show that we’re not the Kmart
of the Caribbean!
Carnival’s vice president of marketing ser-
vices, Christine Arnholt, who was the
primary contact with the advertising
agency that created the campaign, added,
One of the single most difficult things
to do is change perception. Our prod-
uct has changed so much! And we
don’t get credit for that in the mar-
ketplace. We’ve been incredibly suc-
cessful over the years, but from a
brand standpoint, there are still these
lingering perceptions. Some people
hear “Carnival,” and think, oh, that’s
the party ships with all the twenty-
year-olds. How do you change these
perceptions? After all, we are the Fun
Ships. We’ll always be the Fun Ships.
Author’s Analysis and
Managerial Implications
While the brand stewards at Carnival
Cruise Lines cannot relax their efforts, the
brand is in an enviable position. Not only
is Carnival the world’s most popular—and
profitable—cruise line, but the Fun Ships
brand is well known to consumers and
travel agents. At the same time, research
by industry analysts at Bear Stearns sug-
gested that increasing similarity across
brands in the design of new ships and in the
services offered has made it difficult for
consumers to discern differences between
the brands.25 Industry innovations—from
bars of all types (pizza, sushi, ice cream,
cappuccino, wine, martini, and cigar) to
the indoor shopping promenades and pool-
deck movie screens—were imitated in one
form or another by competitors, leading to
no real sustainable advantage for the inno-
vator. Indeed, several of Carnival’s signa-
ture elements, from the showpiece atriums
to the in-cabin towel animals, are now
commonplace.
Much of this convergence has occurred
between the “premium” and “contempo-
rary” sectors of the industry, as premium
brands such as Princess made their prod-
uct more accessible to the mass market (in
effect, reaching down market), while con-
temporary brands such as Carnival aug-
mented their product to appeal to more
sophisticated travelers (in effect, reaching
up market); the result is that the big cruise
brands pursue the same customers. Industry
insiders argue that there are clear differ-
ences between the brands, especially within
the contemporary sector. Whether con-
sumers (let alone travel agents) accurately
perceive meaningful product differences
is, though, an empirical question that has
received little research attention.26
A main challenge to Carnival’s market-
leadership position is not imitation but
perceptual encroachment on the Fun Ships
brand, such as Royal Caribbean’s adventure-
theme rebranding. RCI challenged
Carnival’s ownership of the fun concept
by defining an RCI version of fun as an
active-adventure vacation. It is also notable
that the next-generation RCI ship features
the first water park at sea—a design that
confronts Carnival’s signature waterslide
both experientially and symbolically. Had
Carnival been first with a water-park innova-
tion, this would have been an ideal extension
of the Fun Ships brand (though Carnival
could imitate RCI’s design innovation).
There’s also the threat of consumer
confusion whenever a brand is reposi-
tioned, even if changes are evolutionary.
Carnival’s veteran marketers are well
aware of the tension faced in developing a
more upscale brand image that matches
improvements in the product, while trying
to “never use the word gourmet.” The
Carnival experience may no longer be
reflected in the beer-chugging contests of
the early days, but neither may it be
reflected in such recent initiatives as the
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Presidential Wine Club. Is Carnival burg-
ers or caviar? Bottles of domestic beer or
flights of premium champagne? Temporary
tattoos or yoga? Does Carnival sound like
Cyndi Lauper or like Bobby Darin?
Carnival’s leaders contend that the cruise
line can be all of these things because
Carnival’s customers are so diverse. Yet, as
management guides the brand toward a
more sophisticated version of fun, the risk
of mixed signals and brand confusion
increases.
Ultimately, a brand’s equity is less
a function of the brand itself and more
a function of the brand’s customers.
Developing and sustaining a power brand
is about making choices: selecting cus-
tomers to target (and not targeting others),
building relationships with the targeted
market(s), and aligning brand meanings
informed by messaging elements (e.g.,
promotion and pricing) and interactions
(e.g., product experiences and service
encounters). High brand equity is achieved
when customers say, “This brand is me.”
Affluent, sophisticated customers might
never feel a bond with the Carnival brand,
so by upscaling, Carnival risks alienating
the cruise line’s core market as they say,
“Sushi, wine, and yoga? That’s not me.”
Carnival executives believe that customer
brand meanings do not reflect “Today’s
Carnival.” But this problem is not just due
to lingering perceptions of Carnival’s past;
it is also due to brand cues in Carnival’s
present, such as direct marketing that tar-
gets bargain shoppers with “one day only”
sales messages.
These risks to the Carnival brand, as a
result of change, are arguably less than the
more insidious risk posed by no change at
all. Such “active inertia,” or unyielding
commitment to a winning strategy in the
face of shifts in the marketing environ-
ment, can threaten even the best brands
(e.g., McDonald’s).27 Some brands get
stale; competitors innovate; markets evolve;
customers’ needs and wants change.
Carnival started as an innovative brand,
turning the staid cruise industry on its
head. The company cultivated a youthful
image for two decades, then, like a cruise
ship making a slow turn, management
began the process of brand maturation by
investing in product and service improve-
ments, changing the drinking age, and ton-
ing down the orchestrated revelry. The
“Million Ways to Have Fun” campaign
said that Carnival had grown up—though
it also said less about what made Carnival
distinctive.
The underlying question for Carnival
should be, “Who are our core guests, and
what do they want in a Fun Ship experi-
ence?” Company executives want to exclude
virtually no one from the cruise line’s mar-
ket. “Casting a bigger net,” though, creates
a challenge because more and different
customers seek fun in increasingly diverse
ways. Today’s Carnival would benefit
from being more precise in segmenting the
market based on the psychographic of fun.
To an extent, RCI is forcing Carnival’s
hand by pursuing “adventurous” vacation-
ers and offering an active, sports type of
fun. Carnival might instead pursue vaca-
tioners who seek pleasure and entertain-
ment, or a more relaxing and diversionary
type of fun that recalls Carnival’s party
pedigree and ongoing product strengths—
fun in music, dancing, drinking, dining,
gaming, playing, and lounging. Entertain-
ment fun is also the joy of watching one’s
children or grandchildren have fun (i.e.,
theme park/carnival fun on Carnival) or
knowing that one’s teenager is having fun.
Indeed, Carnival’s recent alliance with
Coca-Cola to form Club O2 teen centers
(with a “Coke-tail” lounge) is an excellent
example of brand-consistent innovation.28
With a more precise, customer-defined
concept of fun at the center of the Carnival
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brand, management can better determine
which of the myriad cues embedded in the
physical product, service processes, and
marketing messages are aligned with cus-
tomers’ meaning of fun and the equity of
the brand. This demands ongoing market
research to develop a deep understanding
of those Carnival customers who identify
with the brand and active listening to their
needs, wants, and desires—in effect, to
place Carnival’s most profitable cruisers at
the helm of the Fun Ships brand. This also
demands hard decisions about future prod-
uct innovations that will both deliver on
the fun and strengthen the image of the
brand. For example, a bar that features
drinking games, though perhaps fun to a
segment of guests, would do little to build
Carnival’s brand equity; a bar that features
interactive video games and trivia con-
tests, on the other hand, might offer a new
venue for fun that guests would readily
associate with the brand.
***
Once the Kmart of the Caribbean,
Carnival Cruise Lines has emerged as the
dominant brand of the seascape. Like Wal-
Mart in retailing, Carnival’s success can
be attributed to an unrelenting focus on
customer value through low cost and a fun
experience. For Carnival to continue to tap
the rich vein of mass-market vacationers
while burnishing the brand to appeal to
more discerning guests, management will
have to buck marketing wisdom about the
risks of trying to be all things to all people.
The analysis offered here argues for a
more focused approach to marketing the
Carnival Cruise Lines experience based
on the idea of entertainment fun—a
branding theme that leverages Carnival’s
extant brand image and product strengths
while still enabling “A Million Ways to
Have Fun.”
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